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To the Editor: 
Two of us physicians work in a 
rural hospital near Quezaltenango City 
in Guatemala, Central America. We 
heard about your association from 
reading Linacre Quarterly, an excellent 
review for ethics in medical practice. 
We serve an indigenous population 
and we hope you might send us, if 
possible, aid for improving our health 
service. This aid can be surgical or lab-
ora tory equipment, medicines and 
drugs, or recent articles and books 
referring to infectious diseases, trop-
ical medicine, malnutrition, epidemiol-
ogy or public health. ----
Thank You. God bless yo u . 
- Dr. Edgar Domingues 
Sanatorio Pasac I 
Cantel, Quezaltenango 
Guatemala, Central America 
Editor's Note: We suggest that anyone 
able to respond to this plea send medi-
cine or supplies directly to Doctor 
Domingues at the address given. 
Re: Cerebral Death 
To the Editor: 
The rather odd fact is that certain 
sections of the medical and legal pro-
fessions et al. have taken it upon them-
selves to manufacture a new type of 
death which goes by the name of 
"brain death" and which is utterly dif-
ferent from the somatic death which 
has been recognized throughout the 
ages. This innovation is not based 
upon any new discovery with regard to 
death but is of much more ordinary 
parentage and owes its being to 
nothing more substantial than present 
fancy. 
Up until about 20 years ago, when 
a person's heart stopped beating for 
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more than a few minutes, he was dead. 
He was dead then because there was, 
then, no means of substituting for the 
function of the heart. Life was 
thought to be dependent upon the 
function of the heart. Understandably 
enough it was not recognized then that 
it was not the heart that was impor-
tan t . but the circulation. Once it 
became possible to substitute mechan-
ical apparatus for the function of the 
heart, the definition of death, then 
extant, became outmoded. 
Life is an active process, dependent 
upon circulation for it is circulation 
which binds the person into one being, 
that unites the body in a whole. When 
circulation ceases, the body dis-
appears. It has been replaced by a dis-
integrated collection of separate 
organs. That is death: that lack of inte-
gration. Absence of brain function is 
not death. If it were, the child who is 
conceived would be conceived "dead." 
But, often, the woman who has con-
ceived the child is desperately afraid of 
it. She would not be afraid of a dead 
child. No! The newly conceived child 
is very much alive and yet that child 
has no brain function as yet. 
There is an extremely significant 
difference between the brain and cir-
culation. The former is fixed and sta-
tionary and is only an organ of the 
child while circulation is in constant 
movement and life is that movement. 
When that movement ceases for a sig-
nificant period of time, so does life 
cease. The presence or absence of 
cerebral function may determine 
whether further treatment is war-
ranted; it does not determine whether 
the child is alive or dead. That obvious 
fact appears to have escaped attention. 
The heart is an organ even as the brain 
is an organ, but neither the one nor 
the other is the organ of life. A person 
with no brain function is unconscious, 
but he is not dead. But let there be no 
circulation for more than a few min-
utes (when the body is at normal 
temperatures) and he is dead forever. 
It is circulation which brings into 
functional unity the various parts of 
the living body. It is the absence of 
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circulation which is corruption, which 
is death. 
The medical and legal fraternities in 
their wisdom or lack of it, have over-
looked that obvious fact and decided 
to manufacture a new form of death 
- a form in which the person does 
not die but instead is maintained in a 
perpetual state of unconsciousness for 
whatever purposes his attendants have 
in mind. 
Until relatively recently, it was 
thought that if a patient were treated 
in a hospital, that treatment was given 
for his benefit and for his alone. Sheila 
Taub, writing in Connecticut Medicine 
("Brain Death: A Re-Evaluation of the 
Harvard Criteria," vol. 45, no. 9 
[Sept., 1981]) cites the following 
three reasons for treating the irrevers-
ibly unconscious patient. 
(1) The patient's organs become 
available for transplantation while 
they are still in the optimum condi-
tion. 
(2) The patient's relatives are 
spared the emotional and financial 
burdens of treating the patient as if he 
or she were still alive for several addi-
tional weeks when death is inevitable. 
(3) Society is spared the use of 
scarce and expensive resources which 
can more profitably be used on other 
patients. 
In other words, in no way will the 
patient be the beneficiary of the treat-
ment he is receiving. He has been con-
veniently elim inated by the definition 
of his own death. Now the whole pur-
pose of brain death legislation be-
comes obvious. It would be a simple 
matter to discontinue the obviously 
futile treatment if that were the object 
of the exercise . But it is not. The 
object is to obtain the patient's organs 
before he is properly finished with 
them because they "can, more profit-
ably, be used on other patien ts." 
If the declaration of "brain death" 
were only the means by which the 
termination of treatment could be 
brought about, this would not matter 
too much, for the treatment of the 
cerebrally dead is an exercise in 
futility. But that is not the end of 
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brain death legislation; it is only the 
beginning, for once it is enacted it will 
become possible to obtain living 
bodies in a better and better state of 
preserva tion by declaring them" dead" 
at an earlier and earlier stage of their 
terminal illness. 
What do a few residual reflexes 
matter if the patient can neither think 
or feel? Why not declare him "dead" 
now and put him on life support? The 
finding of "brain death" is not a con-
clusion drawn from an examination of 
the patient; it is a predicate of the 
examination. That it has no real exis-
tence is evident from the fact that the 
time of death can be moved about at 
will; it is not fixed by the nature of 
things. Thus the "brain dead" person 
is given two examinations about 24 
hours apart. If his condition is 
unchanged between them, he will be 
declared to have died before the first. 
But the very fact that he was given 
two examinations proves conclusively 
that it was not certain that he was 
dead at the time of the first and it 
proves also that the physician cannot 
distinguish between a live person and a 
dead one. Who, in his right mind, 
would re-examine a person whom he 
knew to be dead already? 
The concept of "brain death" is 
unbelievably naive. It is the product of 
the expert mind and it receives slavish 
acceptance because that is so. The gen-
eral practitioner is only too conversant 
with the meaning of "dead" from his 
own practical experience. He would 
not think to question its meaning. The 
specialist is too far removed from the 
realities of life and death to come to 
grips with them . To him, "dead" does 
not denote the existential condition of 
a person, but the availability of his still 
living body for transplant material or 
experimentation. The opportunity to 
experiment on the living body of the 
"dead" person is too good to be 
missed. 
Let us try to see what the fu ture 
holds if "brain death" legislation is 
enacted. If nothing e lse, it will be a 
heyday for the legal profession. 




close to death , all treatment other 
than that aimed at making him as com -
fortable as possible , even at the 
expense of rendering him unconscious, 
is abandoned . Any hope of curative 
treatment has long since been lost. 
But in the event that the actual 
tim e of death becomes very important 
and it will become important from 
time to time, the whole situation 
w h i c h previously existed, will be 
altered. The poor patient is thrust into 
the impersonal and uncaring maw of 
scientism. 
In all circumstances, except, per-
haps , brain death, the person and his 
brain die together. In no circumstance 
does the person die first and his brain 
die afterwards. If brain death legisla-
tion is enacted, there will be an 
implied duty on the physician to con-
tinue with supportive therapy at least 
until death. This will be so in all 
instances of death. No patient may be 
allowed to die without the fear that 
the physician who so allowed him will 
be found derelict in his duty to the 
patient. Once one physician has been 
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successfully sued for not having used 
every weapon in his armamentarium to 
keep his patient alive, every physician 
will be afraid to discontinue treat-
ment, however futile it may be. In the 
Quinlan case, the court ruled, "He (the 
physician) must do all in his human 
power to favour life against death." 
"All." There is no choice. There are no 
exceptions. 
The fact is that the decision as to 
whether further medical treatment is 
medically warranted can be made, 
reasonably, only by a person who is an 
expert in the practice of medicine, not 
by the court and not by both. What 
the court has failed to realize is that 
the physician is obliged to care for the 
patient's health, not his life . If the 
court would have it otherwise, then 
the court should be burdened with the 
problem of means; of how to care for 
the patient's life other than by caring 
for his health. 
Please excuse the length. 
- Colin P. Harrison, M.B., B.S. 
Vancouver, B.C_ 
If the next issue of this journal should be delivered to a differ-
ent address, please advise AT ONCE. The return postage 
and cost of remailing this publication is becoming more and 
more costly. Your cooperation in keeping us up-to-date with 
your address will be most helpful. 
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